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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S INSANITY TEST
THE RELATIVE desirability of four tests of insanity, the M'Naghten
test, the M'Naghten test incorporating the irresistible impulse rule, the
Durham test, and the test proposed by the American Law Institute,
was recently considered in an unusual Massachusetts case.
Although his attorney entered a plea of not guilty because of in-
sanity, the defendant in Commonwealth v. Chester,' on trial for the
murder of his girl friend, testified that he wished to die in the electric
chair.2 It appeared that prior to the killing, the defendant had been in
a depressed mental condition induced by his feeling of culpability for
various tragedies which had punctuated his life. In the trial court,
although a conflict existed among the psychiatrists who examined him, 4
the defendant was found to be sane under the M'Naghten--irrestible
impulse rule currently accepted in Massachusetts. 5  The decision was
I 15 o N.E.zd 94 (Mass. 195S).
"I am not looking for your sympathy. I am not denying [that] what I did ...
was premeditated, cold blooded murder. The . . . only thing that I want to establish
is that at the time that I spoke with the district attorney .. .I was very emotionally
upset and that I wanted to go to the electric chair as quickly as possible. I have not
changed my opinion.. . . It is my opinion that any decision other than guilty, guilty
of murder in the first degree, with no recommendation for leniency, is a miscarriage of
justice 2' Commonwealth v. Chester, supra note s, at 918.
When he was 5 years old, the defendant ran out of the house without his hat and
his father, running after him, fell, and died. At the age of xS, the defendant sustained
a serious and disfiguring injury to his eye. Later, while the defendant was in the
armed service, 2 pilots lost their lives in crashes of planes on which he had done
mechanical work.
' One psychiatrist stated that the defendant had suffered from a serious mental illness
since age z2 that this condition obtained at the time of the killing. Commonwealth
v. Chester, xso N.E.2d 914, 917 (Mass. 958).
Two other psychiatrists, testifying for the prosecution, stated that the defendant was
"perfectly sane and had no mental illness or psychosis." His intellectual capacity was
tested and found to be normal. Id. at 918.
5 "In order to constitute a crime, a person must have intelligence and capacity
enough to have a criminal intent and purpose; and if his reason and mental powers are
either so deficient that he has no will, no conscience or controlling mental power, or if,
through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectual power is for the
time obliterated, he is not a responsible moral agent, and is not punishable for criminal
acts .... A man is not to be excused from responsibility, if he has capacity and reason
sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular
act he is then doing. . . 2' Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 5oo, 5o (Mass. 1844).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
appealed on the ground that the lower court refused to employ the
Durham test in instructing the jury, but the Supreme Judicial Court,
with some misgivings," adhered to the prevailing Massachusetts rule.
The court specifically rejected the Durham standard,7 but implied that
the test recommended by the American Law Institute, had it been advo-
cated by the defense,8 might have been adopted.
Briefly, the M'Naghten test posits that a man is not to be excused
from criminal responsibility if he has capacity and reason sufficient to
enable him to know the difference between right and wrong as to the
nature and quality of the act he is doing.10 The M'Naghten test is mod-
ified in Massachusetts and elsewher 1 by incorporation of the term
irresistible impulse, which requires that the mental impairment operate
to the degree that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, con-
science, and judgment so that the act was committed under overpowering
compulsion.12 The M'Naghten test is supported by its adherents on
the ground that it supplies the triers of fact with a dear and simple
standard"3 involving definition of legal responsibility rather than defini-
tion of a medical term. ' In addition, may observers feel that the very
stringency of the rule is desirable, and especially so in those states in
which a jury may return a verdict of not guilty without specifying
whether the verdict was based on the jury's finding of insanity or on
its belief that the defendant did not commit the crime.1 5 In such a juris-
'We do not labor under the illusion that the rule in Commonwealth v. Rogers is
entirely satisfactory2 Commonwealth v. Chester, iso N.E.zd 914, 920 (Mass. x958).
' "We are not convinced that the rule of the Pike and Durham cases is a better rule
than that of Commonwealth v. Rogers. Ibid.
8 "No question touching that rule is before us." Ibid.
A "We, of course, intend no intimation that the rule tentatively proposed by the
American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code and which has been recommended
favorably by a majority to the Judicial Council is not a desirable one. . . " Ibid.
1
°"[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, io Cl. & Fin. 2oo, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
' The right-wrong, irresistible impulse test, is used as the criterion of responsibility
in the Federal jurisdiction, U.S. Army, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, Vermont, Vir-
ginia and Wyoming. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, :955).
"' See note 5 s-upra.
'" Commonwealth v. Chester, 15o N.E.2d 914, 920 (Mass. 1958).
2' GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (ig2S).
"'Nine states, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts (only where indictment was
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diction the acquitted defendant cannot be placed in a mental institution,
but must be released upon society. 6
Although interpretation of the word "know" may permit some
leniency, critics of the rule charge that it requires total mental impair-
ment for acquittal, 7 while the reasoning of a psychotic is rarely affected
to the extent of precluding distinction between right and wrong.' More-
over, the behavior of an individual is determined by a combination of
many factors, only one of which is reason. 9 Thus, ability to distinguish
right and wrong is an incomplete test of insanity. Foes of this rule also
point out that it is not clear and simple, as claimed, since "know" and
"wrong" are vague terms20 which have defied uniform interpretation in
the jurisdictions where this test is applied. For example, does "wrong"
mean morally wrong or contrary to law?2' Furthermore, many penol-
ogists feel that the establishment of a criterion of criminal responsibility
is not as important as the determination, from a medical standpoint,
for murder or manslaughter), Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Wisconsin,
and Hawaii, have provisions for automatic commitment of a defendant acquitted on the
ground of mental disease or defect. MODEL PENAL CODE op. cit. supra note -i, at 199.
a "The choice in this jurisdiction is not between confinement and commitment, but
rather between confinement and freedom," Sauer v. United States, 24-1 F.ad 64o, 650
(9 th Cir. 1957), in that if the jury acquitted appellant on the ground of insanity,
there is no provision in the United States Code which would authorize the Government
to have appellant committed. Id. at 651. But see D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1g45)-
"M'Naghten's Case, io Cl. & Fin. 2oo0, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
a "That the insane mind is not entirely deprived of this power of moral discern-
ment, but in many subjects is perfectly rational, and displays the exercise of a sound
and well balanced mind is one of those facts now so well established, that to question
it would only betray the height of ignorance and presumption." RAY, MEDICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF INSANITY 32 (1838); cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.ad 862, 870
(D.C. Cir. 1954); ZILBOORc, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 274 (1943); JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF MAssAcHUSETrs FOR 1957, THIRTY-THIRD REPORT (1957).
"Durham v. United States, supra note L8; Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal
La , 41 A.._A.J. 793 (19ss); Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist Js an Expert Witness,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 327 (1955).
"Sauer v. United States, 24 F.2d 64o, 649 ( 9th Cir. 1957); WEHOFEN, THE
URGE TO PUNISH 64 (1956).
" "As to 'know' there is surprisingly little authority in the cases as to whether it
means mere verbal knowledge or emotional appreciation. The usual practice is to just
say 'know' to the jury, and let it go at that." Sauer v. United States, supra note 2o, at
649. Compare People v. Schmidt, 2x6 N.Y. 324, 11o N.E. 945 (igs) (wrong means
morally wrong), qtith Gibbs v. State, 192 Tenn. 529, 241 S.W.2d 556 (195); State
v. Gardner, 2i9 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (5951); State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234
S.W.2d 587 (1950) ; and People v. Sloper, 198 Cal. 238, 244 Pac. 362 (i926) (wrong
means both morally and legally wrong).
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of whether the mental condition of the defendant requires that re-
habilitative measures be instituted."
The combination of the MNaghten test with the irresistible im-
pulse rule is subject to an additional criticism. The term irresistible
impulse may be impliedly restricted to acts occurring suddenly and
spontaneously, as distinguished from insane propulsions that are pre-
ceded by prolonged brooding or reflection.23
The Durham rule requires that a finding of not guilty by reason
of insanity ensue if the act was the product of mental disease or defect in
the defendant.2 4 Proponents of this rule proclaim that it offers the dis-
tinct advantage of allowing all relevant evidence regarding the mental
condition of the defendant to go to the jury on the ultimate question of
fact, for expert witnesses assessing the mental state of the defendant are
not required to base their judgments on moral or legal distinctions be-
tween right and wrong.2 5  Critics of this rule, however, assert that it
fails to provide the jury with a sufficient guide for determining when
mental disease impairs sanity.26 This has caused some observers to claim
22 "From a practical point of view, does it make any real difference whether we
label a man responsible? Would it be not equally pragmatic to hold everyone responsible
for his acts, whether sane or insane, and then to adopt measures that will: (i) insure
society against further criminal acts on the part of this personi (2) establish clearly
that society cannot, for its own protection, tolerate such acts regardless of the reasons
back of them, and (3) rehabilitate the offender if that is possible. These purposes are
all that are hoped for from punishmenti the introduction of the mythical concept of
responsibility merely clouds the issue." WIGMORE, ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 743
(.929).
"'State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.ad 727 (1954); MODEL PENAL CODE, op.
cit. supra note ii, at 157. See also United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.M.C.A. 314, 17
C.M.R. 324 (x954).
" "It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect. We use 'disease' in the sense of a condi-
tion which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use cdefect'
in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or de-
teriorating and which may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual
effect of a physical or mental disease." Durham v. United States, 224 F.zd 8621 875
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
" "The most vociferous complaint of the psychiatrists about M'Naghten was that
the rule forced them into the impossible position of making a moral judgment. To
answer yes or no to the question whether the defendant was able to distinguish right
from wrong was, for the psychiatrist, to state whether the defendant was or was not,
in his opinion, morally responsible for the crime." De Grazia, The Ditlnction of
Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 347 n. 36 (z955); cf. Sauer v. United States,
241 F.zd 640 (9th Cir. 1957); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSIeTS FOR i 9 -7, Op.
cit. supra note 1S, at 56.
" Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. RaV. 336 (1gvS).
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that the indefiniteness of the rule will lead to grave abuses in its applica-
tion,7 and that since "product" and "mental disease" are ambiguous
terms which have not been adequately defined, 8 the jury is, in fact, given
a meaningless gauge.-
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, being advertent to the de-
fects inhering in the prevailing standards,30 have suggested the following
definition:
Section 4.01 (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the crim-
inality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law. (2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct3 1
Section 4.o1(1), which has been likened by different observers to
both the Durham2 and MNaghten3 tests, actually contains features
"' "Here I concur with Prof. Wechsler that the Durham rule may turn out to be
cruel rather than opening the door to more lenient consideration." Hall, Mental
Disease and Crinawl.Responsi bility, 33 IND. L.J. 212, 221, 222 (1958).
"' "Can anyone make sense out of Durham except that, as Prof. Chayes has shown,
it opens the door to anything and everything." Id. at 2245 Commonwealth v. Chester,
s5o N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1958); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, op. cit. supra note ii,
at 159.
' Hall, supra note 27, at 224.1 5 MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note x , at 156.
" Alternative formulations of paragraph (x) are: "(A) A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect his capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be
held responsible. (B) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or is in such state that the prospect of
conviction and punishment cannot constitute a significant restraining influence upon him."
Id. at 27.
The alternatives to paragraph (x) have been held, by the reporters of the
American Law Institute, to be faulty. Alternative (B) has been criticized in that
the threat of punishment is a single influence upon behavior and not the sole determinant
thereof. Since the M'Naghten rule also employs the single influence theory, alterna-
tive (B) is no improvement on that test. Also, an assessment of responsiveness to the
threat of punishment has been renounced by the psychiatrists working with the
American Law Institute as being unduly hard to determine. Alternative (A) contains
no significant variation of 4.0(). ibid.
Hall, supra note 27, at 224.
8 WMHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 99.
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of both.34  It apparently adheres to the theory of the M'Naghten test
and yet does not incorporate the controversial terms "know" or "nature
and quality of the act.""5 Furthemore, it does not require the expert
witness to make a moral or legal judgment as to what is "wrong." Pro-
ponents of the Model Penal Code test claim that the requirement of
"substantial capacity" overcomes objections to the "total incapacity"
requirement of the M'Naghten test and that the rule permits psychia-
trists to speak freely of the condition of the defendant in accepted psychi-
atric terms.38 Whereas volitional incapacity is recognized as a defense,
the absence of reference to irresistible imIdse permits inclusion of the
brooding, reflecting psychotic within the Institute's definition.37 The
American Law Institute, recognizing that definiteness in this field cannot
exist-8 believes that "substantial capacity" gives a reasonable standard
to the jury for determining the sanity of the defendant from the testi-
mony of the medical examiners3 9
Finally, sections 4.03(3) and 4.08(0) provide for the commitment
to a mental hospital of any defendant acquitted on the ground of mental
disease or defect, 40 and provide that the jury must state whether a ver-
dict of not guilty was based on a finding that the defendant was insane.41
This cures the procedural flaw existing in those states in which any
2
'BIGcs, THE GUILTY MIND (1955).
r WEIHOFEN, Op. Cit. supra note 20, at 63.8 8 
"[It] would facilitate the presentation of expert testimony by providing that
the expert shall be permitted to give his opinion as to the extent if any to which the
defendant's capacity was impaired and to make any explanation reasonably serving to
clarify his diagnosis and opinion, subject, of course, to cross-examination as to any
matter bearing on his competency or credibility or the validity of his diagnosis or opinion.
These provisions should go far, it is believed, to meet the valid procedural objections
advanced by psychiatrists to testifying at criminal trials." JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
MASSACHUSEr's FOE 1957, op. cit. supra note x8, at 6o.
I
T
"The 'capacity to conform' part of the Model Code formula would broaden the
insanity defense in most states by accepting what the law has called 'irresistible im-
pulse... .' WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note zo, at 66. "The Code's formula is as satis-
factory as any that can be found2' Id. at 69.
Id. at 64..
3
*MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note Ix, at is6.
"Section 4.03(3): When the defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental
disease or defect excluding responsibility, the verdict and the judgment shall so state."
"Section 4.08(1): When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or
defect excluding responsibility, the Court shall order him to be committed to the
custody of the Commisioner of Correction (Mental Hygiene or Public Health) to be
placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment." MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 4.03(3), 4.08(), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
'"See notes x5 and x6 supra.
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defendant who has been acquitted must be released without regard to
the advisability of detaining him within an institution for the insane.
Section 4.01(1) of the Model Penal Code seems to incorporate the
best qualities of the M'Naghten and Durham rules, while perpetuating
neither the stringency of the former nor the leniency of the latter. The
Judicial Council of Massachusetts, which assists the state legislature by
drafting and recommending various bills, adopted sections 4.01, 4-03,
and 4.08 over a single dissent in 1957 .42 There is a fair likelihood,
therefore, that the American Law Institute's test will be adopted in
Massachusetts. Although it does not dearly appear that this test would
have induced a different result in the instant case, the rule recommends
itself as an enlightened standard for future application.
"1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETrs FOR 1957, op. cit. supra note xS.

